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COMMENTS
OF BANKS AND MUTUAL FUNDS:
THE COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT TRUST
by John Micheal Webb
I. PRE-1963: THE COMPARISON
Banks have traditionally furnished investment advisory services
to their customers by offering to hold and manage funds. Trust
departments of national banks held assets of more than sixty-five
billion dollars at the end of 1963 in accounts where they had invest-
ment responsibility.' Generally this has been accomplished in the form
of a so-called "managing agency account." In such an arrangement
the bank would undertake to hold and manage for the customer a
portfolio of investments pursuant to a power of attorney giving the
bank complete investment discretion. Because of the expenses involved
in furnishing proper investment counsel, brokerage, and general
management for such an account, only relatively large accounts were
economically feasible for the banks to handle. A small account stand-
ing alone could not bear the expense and remain profitable. There-
fore, banks could only furnish this service to small investors if they
were allowed to pool a number of smaller accounts into a relatively
large "commingled managing agency account" or collective trust.
Prior to 1963, national banks, while authorized to commingle and
invest trust funds held as trustee, executor, administrator or guard-
ian,' were not permitted to commingle regular managing agency
accounts.' In other words, a small investor could not, except within
certain narrow restrictions, avail himself of a bank's services in hold-
ing and managing his investment funds.
During the pre-1963 period, the operations and capabilities of the
mutual fund industry were in sharp contrast to those of the banks.
1 Hearings on Collective Investment Funds, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1964) (hereafter
cited as Collective Funds Hearings).
So-called "common trust funds" were exempted from the Investment Company Act of
1940 by § 3(c)(2). Section 17 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F also permitted
limited commingling.
'The limited mechanism of the common trust fund was first permitted to national banks
in 1937 through the promulgation by the Federal Reserve Board of an amendment to Regu-
lation F, governing trust activities by national banks. Until 1962 the Board confined bank
participation in common trust funds to situations in which banks were acting as trustees,
executors, administrators, or guardians for "true fiduciary purposes." This true purpose test
was the primary road-block to commingled managing agency accounts, the sole purpose of
which would be investment services.
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Mutual investment funds have the character of cooperative enter-
prises." They are based on the theory that investors, individually cap-
able of making only small or moderate sized purchases and lacking
the qualifications or the services of professional investment mana-
gers, can, with advantage, pool their funds. If large accumulations
can be so created, it should be possible to provide skilled supervision
for the common portfolio and to minimize risks by making suffici-
ently broad diversification practicable. The mutual fund's only busi-
ness is investing.' Capital is raised by the issuance of new shares to
each shareholder joining the fund; and capital is returned to share-
holders who wish to leave the fund by redeeming their shares. Typ-
ically a "sales load" of from seven and one-half per cent to eight and
one-half per cent is charged to the investor.! Although recently the
subject of some criticism,' this system has apparently proven suc-
cessful, as the mutual funds now hold some thirty four billion dol-
lars of the investing public's assets and more than three million peo-
ple participate as shareholders.8 In 1961 there were 330 such funds in
operation.9
At the close of 1962 the investment services provided by banks
and mutual funds were not vastly dissimilar in nature." But the
markets served by these two institutions were very different. The
mutual funds, through a system of pooling, were able to serve the
medium or small investor. The banks were forbidden to pool ac-
counts other than those held for a "true fiduciary purpose" as trustee,
guardian or administrator. Therefore, the bank-managed collective
trusts were generally only available to widows, orphans and incompe-
tents but not to ordinary investors. James J. Saxon, Comptroller of
the Currency, pointed out another difference between bank's collec-
tive trusts and mutual funds. In an appearance before a House sub-
committee he stated, "Banks collectively invest with no extra charges
therefor. This highlights the contrasts which are well known through
various studies of the mutual funds industry of the abuses, the very
'See Eliason, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Investment Trusts, 43 ILL. B.J.
836 (1955); Lobell, A Critique Of The Wharton School Report On Mutual Funds, 49
VA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
'The mutual fund is technically a diversified, open-end, management investment com-
pany pursuant to the classification of the Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5, 15 U.S.C.
80a-5 (1958).
" Hearings on Common Trust Funds--Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regu-
lation, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1963) (hereafter cited as Conflict in Regulation Hearings).
' See Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP.
No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
8 1d. at apps. A-B 540-79; and Investment Company News, Dec. 1965, vol. 6, No. 2.
'Wharton School Study, supra note 7, at 37, 40.
10Both mutual funds and bank-operated common trusts could pool funds and invest
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grave abuses of the heavy loading charges that have been imposed
on mutual funds. . .. "'
However, until recently the Federal Reserve Board's regulations
have effectively precluded competition by the national banks with
the mutual funds in the lucrative small investor market.12 Naturally,
the banks desired and advocated a change in these regulations for
many years."2 Charles Young, senior vice president of the City Na-
tional Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, in an address to
the mid-winter Trust Conference of 1960 while speaking of this
problem summarized the banks' attitude as follows:
For some inexplicable reason ... a much different attitude seems to have
existed at the Board with regard to the whole problem of collective
trusts. Almost every effort made by this Association and its individual
members to obtain a less rigid and more realistic, modern approach to
the regulation of common trust funds has been rebuffed. Worse yet, the
Board's action in these cases seemed to reflect the same attitude of reser-
vation and doubt toward common trust funds and fear of their misuse,
which existed 22 years ago with some justification but for which there
is no longer justification today. 4
The banking industry's frustration was soon to end.
II. THE NEw ERA
In September, 1962, jurisdiction over trust powers of national
banks was transferred by Congress from the Federal Reserve Board
to the Comptroller of the Currency. i" Early in 1963, the Comptrol-
ler proposed a revision of regulations"e which for the first time would
authorize national banks to maintain a collective trust fund for
managing agency accounts, thus authorizing the banks to operate in
substance an open-end investment company. Bankers seemed to
believe that this proposed revision would allow them to enter the
mutual fund market. The Comptroller's proposals were generally
acclaimed by the banking industry as follows:
Commercial banks will have powers that will enable them to compete
" Collective Funds Hearings at 24.
52 Section 17 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F.
ja See Young, A Reconsideration of Common Trust Fund Regulations, 99 TRUssS & Es-
TATEs 239 (1960).
14Id. at 241.
15Pub. L. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (1962).
1 Regulation F of the Federal Reserve Board was to be revised.
17 Open-end companies are companies in which there is no predetermined limit on size
or membership and the stockholder or certificate holder has a right to compel the company
to redeem his shares at their asset value. Closed-end companies have set limits and generally
entrance can be gained only by purchasing from a present owner, and shareholders do not
have the right to force the company to redeem shares at their asset value.
[Vol. 20:334
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more effectively with mutual funds and other investment companies
when new regulations proposed by Comptroller of the Currency James
J. Saxon go into effect early in April.... Under the proposed rule, banks
will, in effect, be able to offer their investment services to individuals
in competition with mutual funds, life insurance, closed-end investment
companies, investment advisers and other investment media.' 8
As revised,19 regulation 9 permits the following three types of col-
lective investment trusts:
(1) a common trust fund, in which the bank is permitted to
place individual trusts held by the bank in the capacity of trustee,
executor, administrator, or guardian into the common fund;"0
(2) trusts consisting solely of assets from retirement, pension,
profit sharing, stock bonus or other trusts which are themselves
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code; and
(3) a type of collective trust fund which may contain funds
held by the bank as fiduciary, other than trustee, executor, adminis-
trator or guardian.
It is the third type of collective trust that this comment is con-
cerned with; this would be the so-called commingled managing
agency account. Within regulation 9, sections 9.1 (g) and 9.18 (a)
(3) are the crucial provisions for commingled managing agency ac-
counts. Section 9.18 (a) (3) provides that where not in contraven-
tion of local law, funds held by a national bank as fiduciary may be
invested collectively in a common trust fund, maintained by the
bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of
money contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing
agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that
such money is received by the bank in trust. Section 9.1 (g) provides
that "managing agent" means the fiduciary relationship assumed by
the bank upon creation of an account so entitled (Managing Agency
Account) which confers investment discretion on the bank and
imposes upon it the fiduciary responsibilities imposed upon trustees
under such instruments as wills and deeds.
Adoption of revised regulation 9 opened the doors for expansion
of the banking industry into the area of management services to
small investors, but it was far from the final resolution of all the
banks' problems in the collective trust field. Two primary threats
" Henderson, Widening of Commcrcial Banks' Functions Advocated By Saxon In Two
Distinct Areas, The American Banker, Feb. 5, 1963.
"12 C.F.R. 9 (1963).
0 This type of common trust fund is merely an extension of the powers that national
banks previously had under Regulation F.
" This type of trust is primarily intended for use in handling those retirement plans that
became available upon passage of the Smathers-Keogh bill, the Self-Employed Individuals Tax
Retirement Act of 1962.
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
remained. First, without a favorable ruling from the Internal Rev-
enue Service, it was possible that such trusts would be "associations"
and therefore taxed as corporations." Imposition of the corporate
income tax upon commingled managing agency accounts would
completely destroy their feasibility. Second, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, immediately upon the passage of regulation 9,
began to assert its jurisdiction as a regulatory agency. The SEC main-
tained that such trusts would be within the purview of both the
Investment Company Act of 194023 and the Securities Act of 1933.
The spectre of duplicate and burdensome regulation by the Comp-
troller and the SEC posed the greatest danger. To further compli-
cate matters, the various investment associations and mutual funds
began to voice their opposition to the banks intrusion."
III. TAX ASPECTS
The same law that transferred trust authority from the Federal
Reserve Board to the Comptroller also amended pertinent sections
of the Internal Revenue Code." Section 584, the most important
section to collective trusts, was amended to read as follows:
(a) Definitions.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "common trust
fund" means a fund maintained by a bank-
(1) exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of
moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee,
executor, administrator, or guardian; and
(2) in conformity with the rules and regulations, prevailing from
time to time, of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
or the Comptroller of the Currency pertaining to the collective invest-
ment of trust funds by national banks.
(b) Taxation of Common Trust Funds.-A common trust fund shall
not be subject to taxation under this chapter and for purposes of this
chapter shall not be considered a corporation.
2 Section 11 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes a tax on the taxable
income of "every corporation," but it does not define the term "corporation." The Code's
definitional section at § 7701 (a) (3) provides that "the term 'corporation' includes as-
sociations." The case law definition of "association" that has evolved is far from clear, but
it is broad enough to include a collective investment trust which has the corporate features
of separation of management from ownership and the division of ownership into "shares" or
units of interest.
"The Cole-Wagner Act (Pub. L. No. 768, approved August 22, 1940). Unlike the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which compel issuers of se-
curities to provide full and fair disclosure of information regarding their securities to pros-
pective purchasers, the act, more on the order of the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935,
provides not only for full disclosure of information regarding investment companies and
their securities, but goes further and provides for the regulation of their activities.
24 1964 ANNUAL REP. OF THE INVEST. CO. INSTITUTE 13.
25 Pub. L. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (1962).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 584. Pub. L. 87-722, § 4 amended § 584 by inserting the
phrase "or Comptroller of the Currency."
[Vol. 20:334
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On its face section 584 seems to provide complete protection for the
commingled managing agency accounts if they qualify as "common
trust funds." The danger to commingled managing agency accounts
was created by income tax regulation section 1.584-1 (b). This regu-
lation provides that two conditions must be satisfied by a fund main-
tained by a bank before such fund may be designated a "common
trust fund." The first condition is that such fund must be maintained
by a bank exclusively for the collective investment of money con-
tributed thereto by the bank acting solely in its capacity (i) as a
trustee of a trust created by will, deed, agreement, declaration of
trust, or order of court; (ii) as an executor of the will of, or as an
administrator of the estate of, a deceased person; or (iii) as a guard-
ian of the estate of an infant, incompetent or absent person. The sec-
ond condition is that the fund must be maintained in conformity
with the rules and regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency,
pertaining to the collective investment of trust funds by national
banks, whether or not the bank maintaining such fund is a national
bank or a member of the Federal Reserve System.
The second condition of regulation section 1.584-1 (b) and section
584 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code clearly dictates that state
banks must conform to the Comptroller's rules and standards. It is
the first condition that was the basis of concern over whether the
proposed commingled managing agency accounts would be within
the term "common trust fund" and hence exempt from taxation as a
corporation. This doubt was resolved in favor of the banks when the
Internal Revenue Service on February 24, 1964 issued Rev. Rul.
64-59. This ruling in relevant part states:
[I]t is held that a fund maintained by a bank, exclusively for the col-
lective investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by
the bank, in its capacity as managing agent, in accordance with sections
9.1(g) and 9.18 (a) (3) of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
as amended, will qualify as a "common trust fund" within the meaning
of section 584. ..
This revenue ruling completely eliminated the threat posed by the
corporate income tax. The second hurdle, regulation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, however, was not as easily cleared.
IV. THE JURISDICTIONAL SQUABBLE
The Securities and Exchange Commission took the position that
the situation of all investors in managed commingled funds is the
2"Rev. Rul. 64-59 (1964).
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same, whether the management or the adviser is a bank, a private
investment counselor, a broker-dealer, an insurance company, or any-
one else. The Comptroller of the Currency asserted that regulation
by the Comptroller and the various banking agencies was sufficient
protection for the public without any regulation or interference
from the SEC. Two primary questions seemed to be posed:
(1) whether the newly-possible collective investment funds were
sufficiently like mutual funds to warrant SEC regulation; and
(2) whether, if they were like mutual funds, regulatory action by
one or more bank supervisory agencies would be as satisfactory as
SEC regulation. 8
This jurisdictional dispute posed not only a question of duplicate
regulation but also of the nature and adequacy of regulation.
William L. Cary, formerly Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, emphasized that the inspection and regulation
imposed by the banking agencies was not the equivalent of the "dis-
closure"2 that would be required by the securities laws. The SEC is
oriented toward protection of shareholders by full disclosure; while
the banking agencies are oriented toward protection of depositors by
systematic inspection. According to former chairman Cary, the posi-
tion of the holder of a unit of interest in a commingled managing
agency account was exactly the same as a shareholder in a mutual
fund. In an appearance before a House subcommittee Cary stated,
"The disclosure requirements proposed by the Comptroller's regula-
tion with respect to bank-sponsored mutual funds fall short of what
Congress considers necessary for shareholders of mutual funds."3
In addition to inadequate disclosure, Cary was concerned with
possible conflicts of interest between the fund and other aspects of
the bank's activities. The following four areas of potential conflict
were specifically pointed out.2 '
(1) Since the cash portion of the fund's portfolio may be depos-
ited in the bank and used to make money for the bank, care must
be taken to see that the question of how much of the portfolio should
be kept in cash is decided on the proper grounds. Large amounts of
cash should be kept uninvested only when it is beneficial to the col-
lective trust and not for the benefit of the bank.
(2) The fund has brokerage business to direct. The usual system
25 Collective Funds Hearings at 10.
" 'Full and fair disclosure" of all relevant information to enable the prospective in-
vestor to make an intelligent decision. This goal of disclosure is generally obtained by re-
quiring "registration" of shares and by various reporting requirements. See 2 Loss, SECUR-
ITIES REGULATION, ch. 6 (1961).
" Conflict in Regulation Hearings at 10.
sid. at 11, 12.
[Vol. 20:334
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employed by banks of distributing brokerage according to a formula
which rewards those brokers who keep balances in the bank or have
other business relations with the bank, could lead to excessive port-
folio turnover or to the fund's not receiving the maximum benefit
from its brokerage business.
(3) Fund investments could be used to shore up bank investments.
Should bank investments ever decline sharply while the fund invest-
ments maintained their position, the opportunity for switching invest-
ments would be present.
(4) Banks are underwriters and dealers in various kinds of gov-
ernment bonds, many of which might be a suitable class of invest-
ments for the mutual funds they sponsor.
The SEC maintained that it would be empowered to regulate the
newly-created collective trusts under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933. Ordinarily, sections 3 (c) (3)
and 3 (c) (7) of the Investment Company Act exclude banks from
regulation by the SEC under the act." However, the Commission
maintained that the operation of collective investment trusts by banks
would fall under its jurisdiction without regard to those sections
exempting banks. To bring these collective trusts within the purview
of the Investment Company Act, the SEC subscribed to the theory
that two entities would exist in the operation of these funds by
banks-while the "bank entity" might be exempt, the "fund entity"
clearly would not be. Former chairman Cary, in an appearance be-
fore a House subcommittee testified that, "we should separate out
this pool of funds, or this fund from the bank as such. It is a totally
separate organization."' This separation would create a so-called
"ectoplasmic investment company," a novel legal concept evolved
by the Commission in two cases dealing with variable annuity con-
tracts.3 ' The ectoplasmic theory or principle works to attribute legal
3' Section 3(c) (3) and (c) (7) in enumerating persons not considered to be investment
companies provide as follows:
(3) Any bank . . . any common trust fund or similar fund of moneys con-
tributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administra-
tor, or guardian . . . if a majority of the units of beneficial interest in such
fund . . . are held under instruments providing for payment of income to one
or more persons and of principal to another or others.
(7) Any company primarily engaged, directly or through majority-owned
subsidiaries, in one or more of the businesses described in paragraphs (3), (5),
and (6), or in one or more of such businesses together with an additional
business or businesses other than investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or
trading in securities.
" Conflict in Regulation Hearings at 16.
'SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), Commission opinion
at 39 S.E.C. 680 (1960); and The Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), Commission Opinion at Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 3620 (Jan. 22, 1963).
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existence, as an entity, to one specific activity of a business otherwise
exempt by describing as an investment company any amorphous
group which is deemed to be functioning as an investment company.
This separate ectoplasmic entity, the commingled managing agency
account or collective trust, would not be a bank and therefore would
not be entitled to the banking exemptions of the Investment Com-
pany Act.
The banks' operations would be brought within the ambit of the
Securities Act of 1933 through the use of another, better known
theory. According to the SEC, to make the operation of such funds
economically feasible to banks, it would be necessary to obtain a
large number of trusts and pool them. This, in the opinion of former
chairman Cary, "inevitably means solicitation of the public to buy a
security, that is the unit of interest in the pooled fund."' Such a soli-
citation would amount to a public offering' of a security" by a non-
exempt entity within the terms of the Securities Act. Securities issued
or guaranteed by banks were classified as exempted securities by
section 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act."s But Chairman Cary an-
swered this problem with the statement, "it has been our interpreta-
as Conflict in Regulation Hearings at 6.
a6 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), is the case generally cited in defining
the broadest extent of a public offering. In response to a question concerning what consti-
tutes a public offering, former Chairman Cary, in the Conflict of Regulation Hearings, at
27, described the Ralston Purina case as follows:
It was a case, as I recall it, which involved the offering of a stock option,
a stock purchase plan to the employees of the Ralston Purina Co. And the
court, in that case, Mr. MacDonald, did not fix an exact number of offerees as
the basis for a public offering, but it concluded that if an offering were to be
made to a sufficient number of people to whom the information would not be
intimately already available, mainly the inside officers, for example, of a com-
pany, then in that kind of a case, even the offering of a stock purchase plan
to its own employees constituted a public offering.
It has been suggested that if the banks do not advertise the availability of participations in
these collective trusts, no public offering will exist. However, it was pointed out in Conflict
of Regulations Hearings, at 8, advertising is not the only way to solicit participation. Cary
gave the following illustration: "The Bank of America with 738 branches and 25,700 em-
ployees in California, including branches in every community of modest size, can surely
make the availability of the commingled managing agency account as an investment medium
known in a highly effective fashion." Id. at 8.
"v The term "security" is broadly defined under both the Securities Act and the In-
vestment Company Act to include certificates of interest or participations in profit-sharing
agreements and investment contracts. There is no absolute protection to be found in the
non-existence of a certificate or other paper, the mere existence of a bookkeeping notation
evidencing a unit of interest in the collective trust would be sufficient to create a security.
3 Section 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides in relevant part as follows:
the provisions . . . shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities
: . . any security issued or guaranteed by any national bank, or by any bank-
ing institution organized under the laws of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to bank-
ing and is supervised by the State or Territorial banking commission or similar
official; or any security issued by or representing an interest in or a direct
obligation of a Federal Reserve Bank. . ..
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tion that section 3 (a) (2) applies only to securities directly issued
or guaranteed by a bank. The unit of interest in a commingled fund
maintained by a bank does not represent an interest in, nor is it
guaranteed by, a bank."39 The SEC's position could be summarized
as asserting that the fund is a separate entity from the bank and that
units of interest in it are securities.
The Comptroller of the Currency disagreed with the SEC's position
on both of these jurisdictional theories. The Comptroller maintained
that the regulations imposed by his agency completely precluded any
public solicitation" and that the ectoplasmic theory in this situation
was invalid. Saxon, appearing before a House subcommittee, stated,
"The fund is the bank-it is the board of directors that is respon-
sible for its operation. There is no such distinction we see whereby the
fund becomes a separate creature."'" He further contended that the
ectoplasmic theory was logically unpalatable and violated clear con-
gressional intent to exempt banks from the Investment Company
Act by rendering section 3 (c) (3) and 3 (c) (7) nugatory. In the
Comptroller's opinion, the unit of interest was not a security as
defined by the Securities Act of 1933,42 and the exemption of
section 3 (a) (2) of that act should control." Saxon strongly as-
serted that the inspection and regulation conducted by the banking
agencies was more than adequate to protect investors, and he ap-
peared to favor legislation, "eliminating the horrendous duplication
which would obviously exist if both agencies were left in this field."'
In discussing regulatory jurisdiction, it is important to remember
that the Comptroller's statutory authority extends only to the trust
functions of national banks. Despite the broadening effect of section
5 84 of the Internal Revenue Code, the banks chartered by the various
states might in practice be comparatively free of the Comptroller's
watchful eye. The Securities and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction
would not be influenced by the characterization of a bank as "state"
39 Conflict in Regulation Hearings at 4.
40See 12 C.F.R. 9.18 (1963).
41 Conflict in Regulation Hearings, at 50.
42The Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), defines the term "security" as follows:
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing.4 3 See supra note 38.
"Conflict in Regulation Hearings at 45.
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or "national." In addition, section 9:18 (a) (3) of regulation 9 as
previously discussed makes state law relevant. Looking briefly at the
applicable state laws concerning collective investment trusts, they
seem to fall into four broad categories. Sixteen states appear to ex-
pressly authorize such accounts,45 and twenty-three states seem to
sanction such accounts inferentially.6 Seven states either expressly
forbid such commingled managing agency accounts or place severe
restrictions on them, 7 and four states have no applicable statutes."
Only two states, Missouri" and New Hampshire," have developed
any relevant case law.
In addition to the potential complexity caused by the wide varia-
tions in state laws, the jurisdictional dispute is further complicated
by the intervention of the mutual fund industry. The Association
of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, the Investment Company Institute
and the National Association of Securities Dealers disagreed with the
Comptroller and supported the SEC's jurisdictional claims. "They
... contended that the asserted protections to investors resulting from
the Bank's fiduciary position and from banking regulations and su-
pervision are inadequate substitutes for the protection of section 10
[of the Investment Company Act]."'" Section 10 would in effect
completely frustrate banks in the operation of collective investment
trusts, as it contains a prohibition of bank domination of mutual
funds. Negotiated settlement of the jurisdictional squabble failed to
materialize, and it seemed that congressional action would be neces-
sary to resolve the dispute."
V. ATTEMPTED LEGISLATION
As the result of this jurisdictional dispute, efforts were made to
exempt bank-operated collective investment trusts from regulation
under the securities laws by legislative action. Two bills were intro-
duced during the second session of the Eighty-eighth Congress."
" Alabama, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Vermont.
" Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
" Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vir-
ginia.
5 Arizona, California, Colorado, and Idaho.
4'St. Louis Union Trust v. Toberman, 140 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
"°Mechanic's Nat'l Bank v. D'Armours, 129 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1957).
" First Nat'l City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March
9, 1966), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 77, 332, at 82,589.
" See Collective Funds Hearings at 18.
"aBy "two bills" is meant S. 2223 and the combination of H.R. 9410 and H.R. 8499
which are substantially identical.
[Vol. 20:334
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The purpose of these bills was to provide for regulation by the
Comptroller of the Currency rather than by the SEC of commingled
managing agency accounts created and managed by banks."4 Both
bills received the active support of the banking industry and the
Comptroller.55 The National Association of Securities Dealers opposed
passage of either bill." Robert W. Haack, president of NASD, appear-
ing before a House subcommittee stated, "while the association is
mindful of the possible overlapping of jurisdiction and regrets that
such dual jurisdiction often eventuates in a complex society, it be-
lieves that the protections afforded by the securities acts should be
given to the customers of banks who participate in collective invest-
ment funds."'" Neither bill ever got out of committee."6
On October 22, 1965, just hours before the end of the first ses-
sion of the Eighty-ninth Congress, Senator Thomas J. McIntyre intro-
duced S. 2704, a bill "to provide for the regulation of collective in-
vestment funds maintained by banks, and for other purposes." In
substance, the McIntyre bill would permit banks to operate collective
investment funds resulting from a pooling of their managing agency
accounts subject to regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency
and exempt from the federal securities laws. While hearings were
being conducted on this bill, the Securities and Exchange Commission
handed down its decision on the application of the First City Na-
tional Bank for certain exemptions from the Investment Company
Act of 1940 in operating a commingled managing agency accountY
On March 12, 1966, Comptroller of the Currency, James J. Saxon, a
leading proponent of legislation to exempt collective trusts from the
securities laws, suddenly reversed his position."0 Saxon stated that,
"We contend that the regulations of our office and those of the SEC
are complimentary [sic] and we trust that they will be modified so as
to eliminate duplicate reporting, and other unnecessary activi-
ties. . . "' He concluded that the McIntyre bill would not be needed.
Shortly thereafter it was reported that, "in view of the strong oppo-
sition, coupled with the Comptroller of the Currency's withdrawal
of support for the Bill, it is likely that the Bill is dead for the cur-
rent session of Congress." ' The SEC's treatment of the First National
14 Collective Funds Hearings at 1.
55id. at 22, 72, 85.
1
6 1d. at 113.
I71d. at 116.
ss Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1963, p. 5, col. 1.
" SEC Release, supra note 51.
"0New York Times, March 12, 1966, p. 30, col. 5.
" Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1966, p. 9, col. 1.
62 Investment Company News, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 4 (1966). See also Wall Street Journal
March 15, 1966, p. 9, col. 1.
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City Bank's application appears to be at least partially if not pri-
marily responsible for the death of the McIntyre bill.
VI. THE Citibank DECISION
The First National City Bank (Citibank) had for many years
offered an investment advisory service. This service consisted of hold-
ing and managing a portfolio of investments for individual custo-
mers. The smallest account that it was economically feasible for the
Bank to handle was $200,000. Encouraged by the Comptroller's re-
vision of regulation 9 and the favorable revenue ruling of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service,"3 the Citibank took steps to enter the lucrative
collective investment trust market. The bank proposed to allow
customers to put up $10,000 or more for investment in securities
through a commingled managing agency account. The plan would
allow the bank, as investment adviser, to manage the investment
program, determining what securities would be purchased or sold.
No sales load or redemption charges would be imposed, and the oper-
ation of the account would be subject to the supervision of a seven
man committee, the statutory equivalent of a board of directors.
The initial units of interest in the account were to be sold pursuant
to a private placement as exempted from the Securities Act of 1933 .64
Pursuant to his regulations, the Comptroller approved the arrange-
ment proposed by the Citibank." In addition, the Federal Reserve
System ruled that the proposed arrangement would not violate sec-
tion 32 of the Banking Act of 1933. Section 32 prohibits any indi-
vidual primarily engaged in, or associated with a corporation or part-
nership primarily engaged in, the "issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale or distribution . . . of . . . securities" from serving as an
officer, director or employee of any member bank of the Federal
Reserve System." Having obtained the approval of the Comptroller
and the Federal Reserve Board, the Citibank approached the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission.
The Bank filed an application to register as a diversified open-end
management investment company under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, and to be exempted from various provisions of that
act. The principal exemptions sought for the account were from sec-
tions 10 (b) (3), 10 (c) and 10 (d) (2) of the act."7 Basically, the
63 Rev. Rul. 64-59 (1964).64 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2).
65 12 C.F.R. 9 (1963).
12 C.F.R. 218.111 (1963).
6" Additional exemptions were requested from rules 17 C.F.R. 270.17f-2 and 17g-l, and




exemptions were requested in order to permit all but one of the
members of the supervisory committee to be affiliated with the bank.
The mutual fund industry was quick to react to the Citibank's appli-
cation. In a petition filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion the Investment Company Institute formally opposed the estab-
lishment of a commingled investment account and requested that a
hearing be held."8 The National Association of Securities Dealers and
the Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, Inc. both went on
record against any SEC authorization for the Citibank's investment
management plan and joined in the request for a hearing."
The Securities and Exchange Commission held a formal hearing
on the Citibank's proposals."0 Acting under section 6 (c), the Com-
mission, with one exception, granted the bank's requests for exemp-
tions. Section 6 (c) provides that the SEC may exempt any person
from any provision of the Act "if and to the extent that such exemp-
tion is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors and purposes fairly intended by the
policy and provisions" of the Act.7' Relying upon this exemptive
power, the SEC granted the Citibank exemptions from sections 10 (c)
and section 10 (b) (3) but refused to grant an exemption from
section 10 (d) (2).
Section 10 (c) provides that a majority of the supervisory com-
mittee may not consist of persons who are officers or directors of a
bank. The intervening representatives of the mutual fund industry
maintained that this section reflects a deliberate policy of Congress in
prohibiting the domination of mutual funds by banks. The mutual
funds cited the areas of potential conflicts of interest that had pre-
viously been espoused by former chairman Cary' as reason for the
existence of this prohibition. The SEC overruled these contentions,
pointing out that "a specific prohibition against bank domination of
an investment company does not preclude an exemption pursuant
to section 6 (c).,"" The Commission went on to say, "in our opinion,
the Bank has shown that substantial safeguards are present here
against conflicts of interest which could arise as a result of the Bank's
commercial banking activities. '
Under section 10 (b) (3) the supervisory committee may not have
6' Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1965, p. 7, col. 1.
9Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1965, p. 11, col. 12.
7 SEC Release, supra note 51.
" See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., at 13 (1940).
72 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"'SEC Release, supra note 51, at 82,589.
4 Id. at 82,590. The safeguards referred to are the periodic examinations conducted by
the various banking agencies.
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a member who is affiliated with an investment banker unless a major-
ity of the committee is not so affiliated. As the proposed account
would be primarily a stock fund and the bank, as an investment
banker, is limited to underwriting governmental debt securities, the
SEC found that there was no basis for concern that the bank could
abuse its position; therefore, the exemption was granted. However,
the Commission did impose a condition that the account would not
be permitted to buy any securities underwritten by the bank during
the time any such securities remained unsold in the hands of the bank
or any other underwriter.
Section 10 (d) would permit an investment company charging no
sales load and meeting certain other requirements to have a super-
visory committee with only one director who is not affiliated with
its investment adviser. However, section 10 (d) (2) requires that the
investment adviser be registered under the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, a condition that the Citibank could not meet because it
would not be "engaged principally in the business of rendering in-
vestment supervisory services" as defined in the Advisers Act." The
Commission denied an exemption from section 10 (d) (2) as being
unnecessary to properly run the account. The SEC's order permits up
to sixty per cent of the committee members to be affiliated with the
Bank, but it requires that forty per cent be unaffiliated.
The Commission approved the Citibank's registration and the
exemptions discussed above by a vote of four to one. Commissioner
Hamer H. Budge dissented from the decision, stating that the specific
ban by Congress against bank management should be repealed only
by Congress itself, not by the Commission through the granting of
exemptions under its general exemptive powers."0 The Commission's
decision is expected to be appealed to the courts by the Investment
Company Institute and possibly by other elements of the mutual
fund industry." The banking industry has continued to press for
legislation exempting its operations in the collective trust field from
the securities laws.' 8 However, the SEC's Citibank decision and the
Comptroller's withdrawal of support for the McIntyre bill indicate
that dual regulation will be the order of the day. But, this regulation
will probably be in a modified form never seen before.
"8 Section 202 (a) (13) of the Advisers Act defines "investment supervisory services" as
the "giving of continuous advice as to the investment of funds on the basis of the individual
needs of each client."
' SEC Release, supra note 51, at 82,593.
"New York Times, March 11, 1966, p. 43, col. 4, and National Association of Securities
Dealers Report to Members, at 11 ,1965).




The SEC's Citibank decision eliminates the final barrier to the cre-
ation of bank managed collective investment trusts formed by pool-
ing a number of comparatively small managing agency accounts.
However, a number of problems remain to be resolved before banks
can effectively compete with the mutual funds. The mutual funds
presently have two primary advantages over the banks. First, they
can sell interests in the fund for a very small monetary amount and,
second, they can publicly solicit for purchasers of these interests. At
the moment banks are unable to do either of these. The Citibank plan
is keyed to "investments of $10,000 or more '"" per investor. That
figure certainly precludes a very large proportion of the investing
public; the investment is simply too big. Before banks can really
enter the "mutual fund market," they must substantially reduce the
size and price of the available investments.
Public solicitation of purchasers is the key problem that must be
solved before the banks can sufficiently reduce their prices. While the
mutual funds are presently able to solicit and advertise with com-
parative freedom, the Comptroller's regulation would apparently
prohibit such solicitation by the banks. Arguments can be made to
support the proposition that banks are already in such a favorable
position to obtain investors that any prohibition of public solicitation
would not greatly impede their competitive effectiveness. For ex-
ample, the banks are already in relatively intimate contact with the
best potential mutual fund customers, namely, their depositors. In
addition, it is relatively common for potential investors to ask their
local banker for investment advice, particularly in smaller commun-
ities. Such a request for advice would certainly lead to a discovery of
the bank's commingled managing agency account or, if it is a small
bank, the local banker could point out the existence of a collective
investment trust managed by their correspondent bank in a neigh-
boring city. The prevalence of branch banking in some states" would
also help alleviate the solicitation problem. But, even with the pres-
ently available methods of obtaining investors, if the banks desire to
fully utilize all the potentialities of commingled managing agency
accounts, they must be able to publicly solicit purchasers. Under the
various securities laws the banks would be allowed to solicit pur-
chasers for units of interest in the collective fund provided that the
79 See note 51 supra.
"o California's Bank of America with a branch in literally every moderate sized com-
munity in the state is the most striking example.
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units were properly registered." The previously mentioned existence
of dual regulation may help the banks reach a favorable solution to
the solicitation problem if they can convince the Comptroller that
the SEC's registration requirements will furnish adequate protection
for all concerned. The past actions and attitudes evidenced by the
Comptroller indicate that he will probably not be overly restrictive.
The Citibank decision poses another problem in relation to the
governing body of the collective investment trust. Under that deci-
sion only sixty per cent of the trust's supervisory committee can be
affiliated with the bank; the other forty per cent must be unaffiliated.
Two questions are raised by this requirement. First, what will
"affiliated" be construed to mean? Certainly the bank's officers and
employees are affiliated. But what about depositors or the bank's
legal counsel, are they affiliated? Second, presuming a broad definition
of "affiliated," where will the unaffiliated forty per cent come from?
Once the definition is arrived at, the majority of legal problems will
be easy to solve, but the practical problems may prove unusually vex-
atious. Will the bank be willing to lose a large depositor to gain a
committee member, or will they be willing to use a man who is a
large depositor in a competing bank?
Mutual funds have recently been the subject of some rather severe
criticism, particularly the Wharton Report.2 The development of a
strong source of competition, represented by the banks, may prove
very beneficial to the mutual fund industry by forcing reforms such
as the reduction of sales loads.83 The emergence of bank-managed col-
lective investment trusts will aid the prospective small investor to the
extent that he will have a broader range of investment methods to
choose from.
Will bank-operated mutual funds be detrimental or beneficial to
the economy generally? Several views are available. Charles W. Buek,
President of the U. S. Trust Company of New York has expressed
the following opinion:
Is this trend desirable? I would say it is unquestionably desirable. Let's
look at what it might do to the stock markets. We are so-called "pro-
fessional traders." We should in theory have a stabilizing effect on the
market. We are not omniscient, we don't walk on water, but we think
we buy when stocks are cheap a little more often than a non-professional
and sell when stocks are high priced a little more often. I should assume
that we have some beneficial effect on the market."
"' Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
" See note 7 supra.
83 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
84MUNDHEIM, CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1965); BUEK, TRUST COM-
PANIES AND BANKS AS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 149-50 (1963).
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Conversely, there have been expressions of opinions to the effect that
allowing the banks to enter the mutual fund field will cause a detri-
mental result. One line of argument maintains that the creation of
another type of large institutional investor will tend to aggravate the
economic dangers posed by the presently increasing trend toward
larger investors." The single greatest threat that is cited is the con-
centration of corporate control in the hands of these investors. "The
real concern with the potential influence or control of the institu-
tional investor is not in the ownership of debt securities, but rather
in the increase of holdings of common stock investment and, thus,
corporate voting power."" It has been asserted that this voting power
is almost always exercised in favor of the current management, tend-
ing to perpetuate the status quo, frequently at the expense of sacrific-
ing potentially beneficial changes."' A controverting argument to this
line of thought can be based upon the comparative sophistication of
institutional investors. If the banks, as relatively knowledgeable in-
vestors, believe that a management change would improve the oppor-
tunities and potential returns from a corporation, they will be in a
position to force such a change that might not otherwise occur. In
addition, the degree of sophistication that banks reputedly have as
investors will enable them to recognize faster than the average inves-
tor that such a change is desirable.
The effect, whether detrimental or beneficial, on the economy will
probably not be known for several years after this industry has been
in full scale operation.
What is important to recognize at this point in time is that the day
of the bank-managed collective investment trust, available to small
investors, has arrived. In the words of Leon T. Kendall, an economist
with the New York Stock Exchange; "I fully expect in the next ten
years to see a Chase Manhattan Mutual Fund or Bank of America
Mutual Fund. I expect to find banks with demand deposit windows,
savings deposit windows and mutual fund or common trust fund
windows in each branch.""
8 This view is elaborated in another article appearing in the Conference On Securities
Regulation: Brown, The Institutional Investor as a Shareholder 207 (1963).88Id. at 209.
87 Ibid.
88 This opinion was expressed in another article appearing in the Conference On Securities
Regulation: Kendall, Relation of the Individual Investor to the Institutional Investor 164,
at 169 (1963).
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